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ARGUMENT
The Court has now received amicus briefs from the United States, the
legislative and executive branches of Utah’s government, the national and local
chapters of the American Civil Liberties Union, and a broad array of legal
educators, advocates, and practitioners relating to whether this Court can, and
should, “enact[] . . . a state law” permitting undocumented immigrants to practice
law in Utah. The arguments set forth overwhelmingly demonstrate that this Court
may enact a rule authorizing admission of undocumented immigrants to the
practice of law, that such a rule would satisfy the “enactment of a State law”
provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d), and this Court should adopt such a rule to allow
otherwise qualified undocumented immigrants to apply for admission to the
practice of law.
Of all the amici, only the United States expressly opposes the petition. As
discussed below, the Utah Legislature takes no position on whether the Court
should adopt the proposed rule, and the Utah Attorney General suggests the Court
delay adoption of a rule unless and until the Legislature authorizes other
professional licenses. Both branches agree, however, that the Court could adopt a
rule that would satisfy 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). All remaining amici filed briefs in
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support of Petitioners, and Petitioners agree with and join in the arguments raised
by supporting amici as set forth below.
I.

RESPONSE TO UTAH STATE AMICI AND SUPPORTING AMICI
Both the executive and legislative branches of the Utah state government

agree that this Court has the authority and is the proper body to enact a rule
granting undocumented immigrants eligibility for admission to practice law in the
State. While the Utah Legislature expresses concern with characterizing
rulemaking by this Court as “enactment of a State law,” the Legislature recognizes
that licensure to practice law in Utah is “not subject to legislative authority” and is
instead “a province of the Court” pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah
Constitution. Br. of Amicus Curiae Utah Legislature (“Legislature Br.”) at 2-4.
The Legislature accordingly agrees with Petitioners that, if read to require the
Legislature to pass a law granting undocumented immigrants eligibility for law
licenses, Section 1621(d) would violate the Tenth Amendment because it would
purport “to require the Legislature to perform a function that the Utah Constitution
delegates to the Court.” Id. at 7. Moreover, the Legislature is of the view that
“how Utah chooses to make decisions relating to the eligibility for admission to
practice law is ‘not a legitimate concern of the federal government,’” but rather a
matter committed to the sound discretion of this Court. Id. at 10 (quoting In re
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Vargas, 131 A.D. 3rd 4, 25 (N.Y. App. Div 2015)). The Legislature accordingly
takes no position on whether the Court should adopt such a rule, but recognizes
that the Court would be the proper entity to do so. Id. Like the Legislature, the
Utah Attorney General recognizes the exclusive authority of this Court to regulate
the practice of law by rule. Br. of Amicus Curiae the Office of the Attorney
General (“Attorney General Br.”) at 10-11. The Attorney General goes one step
further than the Legislature to conclude that promulgation of a rule by this Court
constitutes “enactment of a State law” under Section 1621(d), but arrives at the
same conclusion—that this Court is the only body constitutionally permitted to
authorize the practice of law by undocumented immigrants, and any interpretation
of Section 1621(d) requiring a legislative act would violate the anticommandeering
principles of the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 9-11. Unlike the Legislature, the
Attorney General counsels the Court to adopt a “wait and see” approach,
authorizing the practice of law by undocumented immigrants only if the
Legislature first passes a statute allowing undocumented immigrants to obtain
other professional licenses. With due respect to the Attorney General, his urging to
follow the Legislature’s policy lead is mistaken. First, different types of
professional licenses implicate different policy considerations—including public
safety and trust in licensed professionals, the risk posed to the public by unlicensed
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practitioners, and the impact of licensing decisions on access to and cost of
professional services. With respect to the practice of law, these considerations are
uniquely within this Court’s expertise and experience. The Legislature’s decision
to extend to (or withhold from) undocumented immigrants other professional
licenses thus has no bearing on whether undocumented immigrants should be
eligible to practice law. Second, and more importantly, this Court should not cede
its constitutional authority to regulate the legal profession to another branch of
government. This is a central point of the Legislature’s own brief—that it is solely
the Court’s province to determine the eligibility of undocumented immigrants to
practice law. Legislature Br. at 6-7. Whether a class of otherwise qualified
applicants should be eligible for admission to practice law in this State is not—and
should not—be conditioned on whether the Legislature first acts to permit those
persons access to other professional licenses.
In any event, Petitioners agree with the Legislature and Attorney General
that this Court must avoid an interpretation of Section 1621 that would conflict
with the Tenth Amendment. Legislature Br. at 7-10; Attorney General Br. at 8-11.
This argument is joined by all amici aside from the United States.
Petitioners also agree with and join the chorus of amici who argue this Court
may, consistent with the plain meaning of Section 1621(d), “enact[] a State law”
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making undocumented immigrants eligible for bar admission. 8 U.S.C. §1621(d).
The term “enact” means “to make into law by authoritative act.” Black’s Law
Dictionary, 643 (10th Ed. 2014). The term “law” refers to “[t]he set of rules or
principles dealing with a specific area,” id. at 1015, and the term “state law” refers
to the “body of law in a particular state consisting of the state’s constitution,
statutes, regulations, and common law.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 1416 (7th Ed.
1999). And the text of the statute—”through the enactment of a State law,” is
passive, suggesting Congress did not want to limit a state’s ability to opt out of
Section 1621(a) to a particular branch of government. See generally Br. of Amici
Curiae The American Civil Liberties Union and ACLU of Utah (“ACLU Br.”) at
6-26; LatinoJustice’s Amicus Curiae Br. at 27-30; Parr Brown Gee & Loveless,
P.C.’s (“Parr Brown”) Amicus Curiae Br. at 7-9; University of Utah, S.J. Quinney
College of Law Amicus Curiae Br. at 10-13; Attorney General Br. at 3-8.
Accordingly, this Court need not reach Petitioner’s argument, joined by all amici
curiae except the United States, that any contrary interpretation would violate the
Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism and state sovereignty.
Petitioners also agree with amici Ad Hoc Coalition of Utah Law Professors
(“Utah Law Professors”) and Parr Brown that a license to practice law in Utah is
not a “State or local public benefit” as defined in Section 1621(c)(1) because it is
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not “provided by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated
funds of a State or local government.” 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A). The Utah
Supreme Court, which approves all Utah law licenses pursuant to Rule 14-104(c)
of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, is not an “agency of a State
or local government”—it is an independent branch of state government. See Parr
Brown Br. at 3-7; Utah Law Professors Br. at 7-10. Furthermore, Utah does not
fund law licenses with “appropriated funds of a State or local government.” 8
U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A). Instead, applicants and attorneys support the licensing
process with admissions, licensing and other fees paid by applicants and attorneys
to the Utah State Bar, a private, non-governmental organization that administers
attorney admissions for the Court. Parr Brown Br. at 5-7; Utah Law Professors Br.
at 11-15 & Ex. B. A license to practice law in Utah is therefore outside the scope
of 8 U.S.C. § 1621, and this Court may adopt a rule making undocumented
immigrants eligible for admission to the practice of law regardless of whether such
a rule would constitute “enactment of a State law” under that statute.
II.

RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES
The United States, for its part, opposes the Petition on two grounds. First,

the United States argues that this Court should decline to enact a rule authorizing
bar admission to otherwise eligible undocumented immigrants—including DACA
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recipients–because DACA is based on an exercise of agency enforcement
discretion that the Department of Homeland Security purported to rescind on
September 5, 2017. Br. of United States as Amicus Curiae (“United States Br.”) at
7-8; see also Elaine C. Duke, Acting Secretary, DHS, Memorandum on Rescission
of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) (Sept. 5. 2017) (“Duke Mem.”)
available at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca.
Second, the United States argues that even if this Court determines it is prudent
permit DACA recipients to practice law in Utah, a rule enacted by this Court
cannot satisfy 1621(d) because “the phrase ‘enactment of a State law’ naturally
connotes a statute passed by the state legislature.” United States Br. at 10. These
arguments are each without merit.
A.

DACA Is Still in Effect and Regardless, Deferred Action Is Here
to Stay

The United States argues it would be imprudent for this Court to grant law
licenses to undocumented immigrants “based on parameters of an exercise of
enforcement discretion that DHS has concluded is unlawful and should, in any
case, be abandoned.” United States Br. at 8. Of course, DACA has been in effect
since 2012, and, as the United States concedes, multiple courts have enjoined
DHS’s attempt to rescind the program. United States Br. at 6 n.3 (citing cases);
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ACLU Br. at 29 n.12 (citing cases).1 Most recently, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a nationwide injunction, holding that
plaintiffs are likely to prevail in establishing that DHS’s rescission of DACA on
the ground that it is an “illegal” program is arbitrary and capricious:
But after a change in presidential administrations, in
2017 the government moved to end the DACA program.
Why? According to the Acting Secretary of Homeland
Security, upon the legal advice of the Attorney General,
DACA was illegal from its inception, and therefore could
no longer continue in effect. And after Dulce Garcia—
along with other DACA recipients and affected states,
municipalities, and organizations—challenged this
conclusion in the federal courts, the government adopted
the position that its fundamentally legal determination
that DACA is unlawful is unreviewable by the judicial
branch. With due respect for the Executive Branch, we
disagree.
The government may not simultaneously both assert that
its actions are legally compelled, based on its
interpretation of the law, and avoid review of that
assertion by the judicial branch, whose “province and
duty” it is “to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). The government’s
decision to rescind DACA is subject to judicial review.
And, upon review, we conclude that plaintiffs are likely
to succeed on their claim that the rescission of DACA—
at least as justified on this record—is arbitrary,
1

See generally National Immigration Law Center, Status of Current DACA
Litigation, https://www.nilc.org/issues/daca/status-current-daca-litigation (last
updated February 7, 2019).
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capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. We
therefore affirm the district court’s grant of preliminary
injunctive relief.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 486
(9th Cir. 2018). Further, despite DHS’s multiple filings for certiorari before
judgment, the United States Supreme Court has not granted review in any of the
pending DACA cases. See United States Br. at 6 n.3. Accordingly, DACA
remains in effect and will likely remain in effect for some time regardless of
DHS’s erroneous position that the policy is unlawful.
Moreover, whether DHS is ultimately successful in rescinding DACA
should have no bearing on whether this Court permits undocumented immigrants
to practice law in Utah. Any undocumented immigrant should be eligible for
admission to the Utah State Bar if otherwise qualified and of good moral character.
This includes individuals who have deferred action relief now and individuals who
might obtain deferred action relief in the future.2 According to the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), “[d]eferred action is a
2

It could also include undocumented immigrants without deferred action
relief. The California Supreme Court took this approach and admitted Sergio C.
Garcia to the California State Bar based on an immigration visa petition that had
been pending for more than 19 years. Mr. Garcia was not eligible for DACA
because he was over the age of 30 when DHS adopted the policy. In re Garcia, 58
Cal.4th 440, 463 & n.18 (2014).
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discretionary determination to defer a removal action of an individual as an act of
prosecutorial discretion.” USCIS, Frequently Asked Questions,
https://www.uscis.gov/archive/frequently-asked-questions (last updated March 8,
2018). DHS considers individuals with deferred action relief to be lawfully present
in the United States because “deferred action is a period of stay authorized by the
Attorney General.” Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th
Cir. 2014); citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. 214.14(d)(3); U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Servs., Adjudicator’s Field Manual Ch.
40.9.2(b)(3)(J).
Deferred action is not an anomaly. Deferred action has been available based
on humanitarian considerations since at least as early as 1975, when the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) issued the following guidance:
“Deferred action. In every case where the district director determines that adverse
action would be unconscionable because of the existence of appealing
humanitarian factors, he shall recommend consideration for deferred action
category.” INS, Operations Instructions, O.I. § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1975); see
generally Shoba S. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration
Law, 9 Conn. Pub. L. J. 243 (2010) (reviewing the legal background and history of
deferred action). The United States may grant deferred action relief on an ad hoc
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basis or may target it at specific groups. According to the National Immigration
Forum, the United States has granted deferred action relief to targeted groups of
undocumented immigrants at least 20 times since the 1970s, and at least five times
since the late 1990s. National Immigration Forum, Deferred Action Basics
(April 15, 2016) https://immigrationforum.org/article/deferred-action-basics/.
Accordingly, as long as deferred action continues to exist, there is no reason to
deny individuals with deferred action relief the opportunity to practice law in Utah,
regardless of whether one deferred action program—DACA—is rescinded by the
United States.
B.

The Court Should Reject the United States’ Arguments

The Court should reject the United States’ argument that Section 1621(d)
requires the Legislature to take action. As the United States itself concedes, “in
many circumstances congressional references to state law can properly be
understood to encompass any state provision with the force of law.” United States
Br. at 11. But the United States, relying heavily on an unexplained sentence in
House of Representatives Report No. 104-725 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), nevertheless
maintains that Section 1621(d) does not permit this Court to enact a law opting out
of Section 1621(a). Of course, “Congress’s ‘authoritative statement is the statutory
text, not the legislative history.’” Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582,
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599 (2011) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546,
568 (2005)); accord United States v. California, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 11275 at
*55 n.18, 2019 WL 1717075 (9th Cir. Apr. 18, 2019) (declining to credit the same
conference report upon which the United States relies with respect to a different
section of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
Similarly misplaced is the United States’ reliance on the Florida Supreme
Court’s advisory opinion in Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: Questions as to
Whether Undocumented Immigrants are Eligible for Admissions to the Florida
Bar, 134 So. 3d 432 (Fla. 2014). In that matter, the Florida Board of Bar
Examiners asked the court for its opinion on whether a particular undocumented
immigrant and similarly situated future applicants were eligible for admission
under then-existing law. Id. at 433. Accordingly, the court surveyed existing
Florida law and determined the applicant was ineligible because “there is no
current State law that meets the requirements of section 1621(d) and permits this
Court to issue a law license to an unauthorized immigrant.” Id. at 435. In contrast
to this case, the Florida Supreme Court was not asked to adopt a rule granting to
undocumented immigrants eligibility for bar admission, and neither analyzed nor
concluded that adoption of such a rule would not satisfy Section 1621(d).
Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court’s “plain meaning” analysis of Section
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1621(d) is dicta, cursory and incomplete. Like the United States here, the court did
not review the dictionary or statutory definitions of “enact” and “law,” address the
multitude of other statutes that use words like “legislature” and “statute” explicitly,
or consider the federalism clear-statement rule. Id.; compare United States Br. at
9-11 with ACLU Br. at 6-18, Attorney General Br. at 2-8, and Parr Brown Br. at 79.
Furthermore, the United States analogy to Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) is based on a logical fallacy.
Hodel involved a Tenth Amendment challenge to the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 (“SMCRA”). Like many environmental statutes passed
in the 1960s and 1970s, SMCRA deploys a cooperative federalism approach under
which states are expected to take the lead in surface mining regulation while the
federal government oversees their efforts. Under SMCRA, if a state demonstrates
that it can effectively regulate surface mining on its own, the federal government
may approve the state’s program. In the absence of a state program, the federal
Office of Surface Mining becomes responsible to regulate surface mining
operations. In Hodel, the Supreme Court ruled that this cooperative federalism
approach to regulation does not violate the Tenth Amendment because the Tenth
Amendment does not “limit congressional power to pre-empt or displace state
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regulation of private activities affecting interstate commerce”—an area of express
congressional authority. Id. at 289-90.
Of course, Section 1621 is not an attempt to pre-empt or displace state
regulation of undocumented immigrants. Federal law does not permit Utah to
enforce its own immigration laws subject to federal oversight. Instead, this section
bars Utah from providing its own state public benefits to undocumented
immigrants unless Utah chooses to “opt out” of the federal rule. Utah’s only role
is to decide whether to opt out, and the United States’ argument that Utah can only
do so legislatively is an impermissible attempt to commandeer the very method by
which Utah makes its choice. Put another way, because Section 1621 purports to
govern “how [Utah] can interact with the federal government, not the activities of
private individuals, . . . Hodel is inapposite.” United States v. California, 2019
U.S. App. LEXIS 11275 at * 49 n.15, 2019 WL 1717075 (holding the federal
government may not require California to cooperate in federal immigration
enforcement efforts without violating the Tenth Amendment); see also Murphy v.
NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018) (“The Constitution . . . confers upon Congress
the power to regulate individuals, not States.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
ACLU Br. at 26 n.11. Section 1621(d) accordingly cannot, consistent with the
requirements of the Tenth Amendment, be interpreted to mandate which branch of
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Utah’s government may enact a law opting out of 1621(a)’s bar on professional
licensure for undocumented immigrants.
CONCLUSION
This Court has the exclusive authority and discretion to “enact[] . . . a State
law” permitting undocumented immigrants eligibility for admission to practice
law.

The United States’ policy arguments are unpersuasive and its statutory

analysis of Section 1621(d) is without merit and would, in any event, run afoul of
the Tenth Amendment. The Court should rejected the United States’ arguments
and adopt the rule proposed by Petitioners.
DATED this 25th day of April 2019.

/s/ Anthony C. Kaye
Anthony C. Kaye
Nathan R. Marigoni
Attorneys for Petitioners Mary Doe and Jane
Doe
/s/ Elizabeth A. Wright
Elizabeth A. Wright
Attorneys for Petitioner Utah State Bar
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